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The speakable and the unspeakable: defining censorship 
To be for or against censorship as such is to assume a freedom no one has. Censorship is. 
(Holquist 1994: 16) 
 
Censorship has always been with us in some form in all societies, and may be simultaneously 
viewed as positive or negative. Much of the difficulty that occurs when discussing censorship 
arises from the fact that there are many types of censorship operating in different societies and 
some of these are accepted, or even welcomed, by majority groups or powerful minorities. Any 
discussion of censorship in recent history and as a contemporary practice is complicated by 
several factors. The term itself can refer to various types of restriction and control; and it is 
affected by changing social and political contexts. It is linked to a series of concepts such as 
freedom of expression, decency, political correctness, and the common good, which are also 
difficult to define and are open to conflicting interpretations. Indeed, the question of what 
constitutes censorship has been tackled by many influential thinkers and whilst their work is 
immensely valuable and addresses several important aspects of censorship in the context of both 




In the 1970s, seminal works by Althusser (1971) and Foucault (1978; 1979) rejected the notion of 
a simple definition of censorship as the imposition of state repression, and explored ways in 
which  it  can  be  seen  as  a  constitutive  or  productive  force  in  society.  Althusser’s  influential  essay, 
‘Ideology  and  Ideological  State  Apparatuses:  Notes  towards  an  Investigation’,  stresses the crucial 
role played by a wide variety of state agencies in the maintenance of ideology. His description of 
the function of ideological state institutions, backed up by repressive state institutions, can most 
obviously be applied to the regulatory censorship practices in use in authoritarian regimes, but 
also go beyond the traditional interpretation of censorship as simply imposed by an authority on 
an individual. 
 
Foucault’s  work  on  the  integrated  relationship  between  knowledge  and  power  has  had  a  bearing  
on much contemporary thinking on censorship: 
 
What makes  power  hold  good,  what  makes  it  accepted,  is  simply  the  fact  that  it  doesn’t  
only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it 
induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a 
productive network, which runs through the whole social body, much more than as a 
negative instance whose function is repression. (1980: 119) 
 
Drawing  on  Bentham’s  thesis,  Foucault  identified  ‘panopticism’  as  one  of  the  keys  to 
understanding censorship in contemporary liberal society, and his work is often applied to 
considerations of the operation of democratic bureaucratic and social systems where power 
regimes based on surveillance and self-censorship are internalised and normalised, rather than 
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imposed from above (Foucault 1979). He considered censorship to be a productive force, rather 
than simply a regulatory one, and his theories have influenced many later critics, such as Pierre 
Bourdieu and Judith Butler, who have written about the concealed presence and formative power 
of censorship within wider social communication in all societies. For his part, in his British 
Academy Lecture, Censorship and the Limits of Permission, Jonathan Miller asserted that 
 
the rules, principles, policies, and ideals by which we live are as much constitutive as 
they are regulative, that is to say they exist not simply to prevent a ferocity which we 
otherwise dread, but partly to define the identity of the community which might 
otherwise be unrecognisable both to itself and to outsiders who look at it. (1971: 11) 
 
Miller’s  discussion  of  censorship  in  terms  of  morality,  harmfulness  and  offence  anticipates  the  
later debates engaged in by critics such as Malik (2008) and Collini (2010). 
 
In the 1980s and 1990s, important contributions by Jansen (1988), Bourdieu (1991), Butler 
(1997) and Post (1998) have enhanced our understanding of censorship and cultural control, both 
regulative and productive. Pierre Bourdieu, for example, argues: 
 
censorship is never quite so perfect or as invisible as when each agent has nothing to say 
apart from what he is objectively authorized to say: in this case he does not even have to 
be his own censor because he is, in a way, censored once and for all, through the forms 
of perception and expression that he has internalized and which impose their form on all 
his expressions. (1991: 138) 
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Susan Curry Jansen maintains that, in addition to what she terms regulative censorship, there 
exists  a  ‘constitutive  or  existential  censorship’  which  ‘is  a  feature  of  all  enduring  human  
communities – even  those  communities  which  offer  legislative  guarantees  of  press  freedom’  
(1988: 8).  Butler  too,  takes  issue  with  traditional  interpretations  of  censorship  which  ‘presume  
that it is exercised  by  the  state  against  those  who  are  less  powerful’,  and  puts  forward  an  
alternative view that is linked to discursive agency: 
 
Censorship is most often referred to as that which is directed against persons or against the 
content of their speech. If censorship, however, is a way of producing speech, constraining 
in advance what will and will not become acceptable speech, then it cannot be understood 
exclusively in terms of juridical power. (1997: 128) 
 
Censorship,  she  argues,  ‘is  a  productive  power:  it  is  not  merely  privative,  but  formative  as  well’  
(1997: 133). For Robert C. Post, the new, broader interpretation of censorship involves a move 
away from the binary opposition of traditional liberal versus conservative views on censorship 
and represents,  he  claims,  ‘exciting  and  important  intellectual  developments’  (1998: 4). In its 
engagement with various forms of censorship, this book aims to contribute to these 
developments. 
 
The continued relevance of censorship to our understanding of how society functions is 
highlighted in recent works by Dollimore (2001), Müller (2004), Reinelt (2006; 2011), Petley 
(2009), Freshwater (2004; 2009) and Collini (2010), among others. All have explored how 
censorship and cultural regulation are manifested in contemporary society, often focusing on the 
clash of rights that is at the centre of much discussion of the topic. Debates about censorship are, 
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in some ways, more complex in contemporary democratic societies than in authoritarian regimes; 
in other ways, they represent a return to some of the debates of the Enlightenment period and to a 
discussion of what limits, if any, should be placed on freedom of expression, including the 
freedom to offend and to be offended. Many people, particularly in contemporary western 
democratic societies, are willing to accept, if not to advocate, a range of limitations on freedom of 
expression, often linked to the imposition of restrictions on racist, homophobic, or misogynistic 
texts or speech acts, or for the protection of children. In her important article  ‘The  Limits  of  
Censorship’,  Janelle  Reinelt  contends  that  the  generally  accepted  democratic  right  to  free  
expression 
 
must be balanced among competing alternative rights (privacy, respect, civility, 
among others) and sometimes those competing rights have been difficult to 
assimilate  or  fold  into  a  larger  good  recognised  by  society’s  members  as  necessary  
for its health and well-being. (2006: 6) 
 
Freshwater too, in her discussion of the forced withdrawal of the play Behzti from the 
Birmingham  Rep  theatre  in  2004  argues  ‘that  we  have  to  face  up  to  the  tension  between  the  
liberal  ideals  of  freedom  of  expression  and  respect  for  cutural  difference’  (2009 : 148). Others, 
such as Collini (2010) and Malik (2008), disagree with the need to balance other rights with 
the right to freedom of expression, insisting that the latter is a fundamental right.  This 
argument rests on the notion that as certain protections, such as legislation regarding slander 
and incitement to hatred, exist in law, the need to limit freedom of expression is moot. Indeed, the 
United States Constitution (First Amendment, 1791), Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (1948), and the 1976 ruling of the European Court of Human Rights, all stress the 
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importance of freedom of expression as a fundamental right (Petley 2007: 187-88; 2009: 162-65). 
Instead of preventing expression of disagreeable or offensive material, it is reasoned that the 
focus should instead be on the punishment of criminal acts. Yet as Irena Maryniak argues in 
Offence: The Christian Case,  ‘in  societies  bound  up  with  displays  of  conventional  order,  
propriety,  stability  and  integration,  disparaging,  offensive  or  “blasphemous”  expressions  are  very  
readily perceived as acts of defamation’  (2009: 1). Her work reveals the complexity of this 
position and current divisions on the matter, which also relate to the asymmetries of power in 
many democratic societies. 
 
This debate about balancing opposing rights or defending absolute rights, which often seems to 
dominate present-day discussions of censorship, is further complicated by the issue of blasphemy, 
and there are many in contemporary democratic societies who argue for the protection of 
minority religions and, by extension, communities, from criticism and negative judgement. Salil 
Tripathi, writing in Index on Censorship, stresses the limitations of this stance: 
 
We have come to expect that if someone writes or paints or imagines something that 
others find offensive, the offended party will take the law into their own hands and 
impose silence. This should outrage us. Instead, some have been telling writers to think 
more pleasant thoughts, artists to curb their imagination, playwrights to tackle safer 
topics, and not provoke the beast within all communities and religions. (2008: 170-71) 
 
Oliver Kamm is another who sounds a warning: 
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The notion that free speech, while important, needs to be held in balance with the 
avoidance of offence is question-begging, because it assumes that offence is something 
to be avoided. Free speech does indeed cause hurt – but there is nothing wrong in this. 
Knowledge advances through the destruction of bad ideas. (2007: 84) 
 
Bernard-Henri  Lévy  too,  argues  that  ‘the truth is that a world where we no longer have the right 
to laugh at dogma would be an  impoverished  world’ (2008: 130). Stefan Collini makes a direct 
link between such balancing of rights and consensus politics and what he perceives to be a 
growing trend in self-censorship resulting from the belief that there is a need to show respect 
to minority cultures, so as to avoid  conflict.  He  acknowledges  that  ‘there  may  be  situations  in  
which it is prudent to refrain from expressing contentious views, but that does not at all mean 
that their contentiousness is a legitimate ground for prohibiting their expression in general’  
(2010: 40). 
 
While it is clear from recent discussions that censorship is more than top-down repression, the 
notion of a productive or constitutive censorship incorporating forms of cultural control not 
covered by the obvious apparatuses of official state regulation is both contentious and difficult to 
pin down. A wider definition of censorship is, as Müller suggests, in danger of muddying the 
waters in any discussion of the issue and comes, as  Post  contends,  ‘at  the  price  of  a  certain  
abstraction’  (2004: 4). Yet, in contemporary society, whether under autocratic or democratic rule, 
it is clear that non-regulatory forms of cultural control do have an impact on authors, spectators, 
and society generally. As long as there are asymmetries of power within society, the question 
of respect for minorities, protection for certain groups and the abuse of power on the part of 
dominant elites will remain part of the debate. Therefore, the essays in this volume encompass 
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a broad definition of censorship and cultural control, while remaining cognisant of the particular 
socio-historical contexts in which these emerge. We are not presenting a new theory of 
censorship in this volume, but we are considering its many manifestations both as constitutive 
process and as a tool of repression.   
 
Types of censorship 
If censorship is a technique by which discursive practices are maintained, and if social life 
largely consists of such practices, it follows that censorship is the norm rather than the 
exception. Censorship materializes everywhere. (Post 1998: 2) 
 
There is no single form of censorship that fits all places and circumstances. ‘Prior censorship’ 
attempts to prevent something from being publicly expressed, while ‘punitive censorship’ 
punishes someone for what they have already disseminated. Censorship can include deletions, 
rewritings and insertions within a text; the proscription of actions, inflections or visual 
components in performance; the prohibition of individual works; the withdrawal or 
cancellation of works; the blacklisting, imprisonment or exile of an author; and, in extreme 
cases, even the killing of authors whose works are deemed a threat to the established order.  In 
keeping with new definitions of censorship, Richard Burt considers it to be a scale, moving from 
‘soft’  to  ‘hard’  forms  of  regulation  (1998: 18). Judith Butler  contends  that  ‘explicit  and  implicit  
forms exist on a continuum in which the middle region consists of forms of censorship that are 
not  rigorously  distinguishable  in  this  way’  (1998: 249-50). For Freshwater too, censorship can be 
viewed  as  ‘a  continuum,  with  the  brutal  extremes  of  incarceration  and  murder  at  one  end  and  the  
constitutive operation of self-censorship at the other’  (2009: 11). 
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Drawing on the Foucauldian idea of pervasive networks of power, we can identify several  
less obvious forms of censorship, not always imposed by official bodies, and including the 
humiliation, harassment and exclusion of authors; the imposition of fines and travel 
restrictions; loss of employment; and public campaigns against writers. Other forms of 
censorship include practices such as restrictions on the length of performance runs and types 
of venue. This type of constraint can be linked to Richard  Burt’s  model  of  censorship,  which  is  
about  ‘dispersal  and  displacement’,  rather  than  ‘removal  and  replacement’  (1998: 17). While 
criticised by many of those affected, such as Fernando Arrabal in Spain, controls of this sort 
may, paradoxically, be linked to the emergence of an alternative, underground theatre scene, 
as described by Ostrowska in her essay on student and independent theatre groups in Poland.  
 
Nor is censorship confined to the author of any given text, as publishers, readers, translators 
and performers have also suffered various forms of censorship and punishment for their part 
in the dissemination of a text or a play. Threats, fines, restrictions on paper supplies and 
imprisonment may all be applied, and prizes and subsidies used to reward or exclude. 
Conversely, editors, translators and publishing companies may also play the role of censor, in 
the preparation of a text for submission to the official state bodies or in response to social 
pressure. In some cases, as we shall see, this amounts to another layer of direct censorship 
where their intervention leads to an initial round of textual cuts. In yet other instances, they, 
like the authors themselves, may have internalised the cultural norms of the day and made 
suggestions for textual changes in a less conscious way. Arguably, as Bourdieu suggests, 
such forms of censorship are the most successful and hardest to challenge, as they are hidden 
or unconscious (1992: 138). For Butler, the distinction between explicit and implicit censorship 
must be made: 
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The latter refers to implicit operations of power that rule out in unspoken ways what will 
remain unspeakable. In such cases, no explicit regulation is needed in which to articulate 
this  constraint.  […]  Such  implicit  forms  of  censorship  may  be,  in  fact,  more  efficacious  
than explicit forms in enforcing a limit of speakability. Explicit forms of censorship are 
exposed to a certain vulnerability precisely through being more readily legible. (1997: 
130) 
 
Reflecting the fact that not all censorship is official or documented, several of the 
contributors to this volume comment on the network of bodies involved in censorship, as well 
as its invisibility and insidious nature. 
 
All of the above demonstrates the complexity of censorship and the resultant difficulty when 
analysing its practice and impact. While censorship is legislated for and systematically 
applied in some places, it assumes a more shadowy threat in others. Though the essays in this 
volume describe the different formal and informal censorship procedures in place across several 
states with differing ideologies, it is interesting to note certain parallels within all systems and 
certain recurrent accommodations made to deal with shifting political goals. 
 
Censorship is usually political or moral, and sometimes religious, or a combination of these. 
Several factors influence the decision to censor and the severity of the censorship applied, 
including consideration of the genre, the notoriety of the author, the political or moral content 
of a text, and the intended readership. In addition, the political context is always crucial, and 
censorship may be more or less strictly applied at particular moments, depending on 
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circumstances, including changes in political regime, internal personnel and wider society. 
The introduction or intensification of political censorship is often linked to moments of 
significant social transformation and, in the aftermath of conflict and regime change, is 
usually linked to the creation and protection of a new national political identity. Moral 
censorship, like political censorship, is closely allied to national identity and to xenophobia, 
as it insists on certain social behaviour and often a racial, as well as moral, purity that is 
essentially mythical.1  
 
In certain circumstances, such as during a conflict or a struggle for independence, many people 
who would otherwise defend freedom of expression, may advocate certain restrictions. Hence, 
while it may initially be introduced and justified in extreme circumstances, and often as a 
temporary measure, as with the Soviet Glavlit in 1922, harsh censorship may subsequently be 
normalised, particularly in non-democratic contexts, as was the case in post-Civil War Spain, 
East Germany, post-independence Zimbabwe and South Asia, and Brazil under military 
dictatorship. Existing censorship legislation, be it from wartime, or a previous regime, may be 
retained and employed within a new social order. The continued reference to a threat to 
national security from an identified enemy of the people, and the protection against this 
provided by the state, aids the normalisation of censorship in such circumstances. As is clear 
from several examples given in this volume, politically-motivated agents, whose own interests 
are not entirely separable from what they claim to be in the national interest or the common good, 
are the people who argue most vehemently for, and attempt to justify, the continuation of official 
censorship. Yet censorship is presented as a reflection of widespread public opinion or 
consensus in society, rather than the reflection of the political interests of a few. This could 
be seen as the essential dishonesty of much censorship: its practice in the name of a common 
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good that is not, in fact, served. As we see in essays in this volume by Cabrera, Gombár and 
Zenenga, for example, this causes problems for those who wish to criticise the authorities or 
put forward an alternative political view, as their stance is represented as a threat to security, 
rather than as part of a rational political debate. 
 
In certain countries where the church-state divide is blurred or non-existent, political 
censorship has a strong tendency to go hand in hand with repressive moral or religious 
censorship,  which  reflects  the  leaders’  definitions  of  themselves  as  morally  pure  and  superior , 
and their religious beliefs as untouchable. This can be seen in the essays on Spain, Portugal 
and Brazil. In Ireland, as Ó Drisceoil shows, the strict moral censorship demanded by non-
state bodies, such as Catholic Action, was often supported by the authorities in a state that 
had constructed a strongly Catholic national identity and reflected a severely restricted view 
of sexual morality. Elsewhere, such as in Britain, the moral censorship that dominated the 
theatre until 1968 was a reflection of conservative Victorian values, as Nicholson highlights 
in his essay. Generally, with all forms of moral censorship, there is a concentration on 
traditional ideas of respectability and decency presented as constituting a natural social 
consensus, an obsession with the body and with sexual morality, and a strong resistance to 
outside influence and internal social change. As with political censorship, there is a mistaken 
belief that if literature and, in the case we are examining, the theatre, can be cleansed of 
obscenity, immorality, indecency and vulgarity, then the pretence that these do not exist in 
society can also be upheld.  
 
The secrecy of censorship 
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It is a revealing feature of censorship that it is not proud of itself, never parades itself . 
(Coetzee 1996: 35) 
 
The practice of censorship is often shrouded in secrecy, a fact commented upon by several of 
the contributors to this volume. Often, the bodies in charge of censorship are given titles that 
do not reflect the reality of their function, for example, Glavnit, the Soviet Central 
Administration for Literary Affairs and Publishing, the Ministry for Tourism and Information 
in Spain, and the  Ministry  of  Education  and  Culture’s  ambiguously-named  ‘Operación  Claridad’  
(Operation Clarity) in Argentina (Graham-Jones 2011: 102). 
 
The censors, or readers as they are often called, tend to be anonymous, though this varies 
across states and times. The Polish censor, K-62, who admitted to being a frustrated writer 
himself and to being enticed by the financial reward, confirmed the secrecy and the ambiguity of 
the system there:  ‘A lot of things were settled by telephone. Various high-ranking people 
telephoned and gave word of mouth instructions, leaving no traces’  (Kuhiwczak 2008: 48). 
Bonsaver  refers  to  the  ‘half-written  rules’  of  censorship  in  Fascist  Italy  (2007: 207), a practice 
common in Hungary also, according to Gombár in her contribution to this volume. There were 
exceptions, of course, and as well as presiding over censorship systems, the political leadership 
sometimes participated directly in control of the press, literature or the stage. In Italy, for 
example, Mussolini occasionally involved himself in censorship decisions, and in the Soviet 
Union, Stalin and Khrushchev were both hands-on censors (Bonsaver 2007: 64, 159; Talbot 
2007: 151; Ermolaev 1997: xiii). Most censors are not political leaders, however, and see their 
job as an administrative task as banal as any other, as the Polish writer Fedorowicz suggests: 
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the people who work as censors are just like us, only maybe a bit weaker. Some bloke 
finishes his studies of the Polish language, has a wife and two kids, they offer him a job 
— he takes it. He does what he is told — nothing on his own initiative — he is not 
overzealous. (1985: 15) 
 
Official state censors are often writers, journalists, priests, academics, critics, as well as civil 
servants chosen for their political allegiance and loyalty, rather than for their suitability for the 
task. Of course, as several of the contributors, such as Ó Drisceoil, Goldman and Houchin note 
in this volume, censorship may also involve several other bodies operating through complex 
social and political networks.  
 
The threat from the theatre: freedom and change 
Thanks to the effects of lighting, sound, costumes, scenery, gestures and intonations, a play was 
likely to make a stronger impression on the viewer than a book on the reader. (Ermolaev 1997: 7) 
 
It is worth remembering, as André Brink argues,  that  ‘censorship is not primarily a literary, or 
even a moral institution but part of the apparatus of political power’ (1981: 9). It forms part of a 
network of social control that aims to restrict change. Often employing censorship in the 
name of the protection of the common good and of political or social stability, the failure of 
such ostensibly positive concepts to withstand irony, criticism or debate points instead to the 
weakness of those who employ such terms to prop up a dubious or weak political power.  
 
Milan Kundera contends,  ‘ideology wants to convince you that  its truth is absolute. A novel 
shows you that everything is relative’  (1977: 7). Literature, therefore, could be seen as the 
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enemy of certainty and of dogmatic thinking. As Ilan Stavans comments in an interview: 
‘Fiction has always been understood to have a double edge – it allows for an escape from 
routine and it also showcases the possibilities of freedom’  (Albin 2005, n.p.). Literature 
encourages the exploration of alternative, and often controversial, perspectives and the 
confrontation of murky secrets and taboos. 
 
On a more abstract but related level, literary works and genres that do not respect traditional  
structures or the prevailing stylistic or thematic norms foreground the possibility of change 
by their very form. Such was the impact of the work of modernists in Russia, for example, 
where their style was taken as evidence of decadence and interpreted as an affront to the 
politically-sanctioned forms and themes of social realism. In Spain, too, Fernando  Arrabal’s  
experimental theatre was interpreted by censors as evidence of his malice, his instability and 
his godlessness (O’Leary  2008). 
 
While the parallels between literary and social freedom can be drawn generally, the theatre is 
often judged to be a particular threat because of its potential  for political mobilisation. 
Theatre, like other forms of literature, constructs, reflects and critiques how we view 
ourselves and wish to be viewed by others. Yet, given its public and social character, it is also 
one of the best fora for the exploration of unusual perspectives and values, and speculation 
about alternative visions of society. The theatre can enact on stage behaviour that would not 
be tolerated elsewhere. It can force the public to face the unpalatable, and to reflect on the 
motivations and consequences of certain actions. It can also expose what is hidden in society, 




Moreover, when the press is not free, the theatre may be one of the places where people seek 
the political commentary, albeit veiled, that is absent from other media. Like all good art, the 
theatre can provoke a public reaction and the danger associated with it is often linked to its 
supposed transformative capacity. One of the strengths, but also one of the perceived threats of 
the theatre is the communal aspect of performance and the solidarity it can engender. Theatre, 
after all, gathers people together to share an experience in the relative safety and anonymity 
of the playhouse, at times in circumstances where free association or freedom of movement is 
otherwise restricted, as Zenenga, Tyszka and Ostrowska show. Moreover, theatre is 
unpredictable: because it is live performance, it can be adapted to fit the circumstances of its 
staging, a fact that has been both taken advantage of by many playwrights and recognised by 
many censors, who have regularly considered it necessary to view dress rehearsals and even 
performances in order to monitor aspects of staging such as the use of costume and the delivery 
of lines. Improvised or experimental theatre that is not text-based is harder to censor and 
therefore often attractive to those who wish to present a political message in circumstances where 
freedom of expression is curtailed, and several essays here comment on the emergence of such 
theatre in a variety of political contexts. 
 
Authorities may also fear that dramatists, like other writers, may be more persuasive in their 
arguments than politicians, and more adroit at influencing the public. The fear may be that 
the world represented by the dramatist will seem more attractive than the everyday reality of 
the public and may encourage people to act to change their personal circumstances or society 
as a whole. Marcuse’s  comments  on art can, therefore, be applied to the theatre also: 
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Art breaks open a dimension inaccessible to other experience, a dimension in which 
human beings, nature and things no longer stand under the law of the established 
reality principle. Subjects and objects encounter the appearance of the autonomy 
which is denied them in their society. The encounter with the truth of art happens in 
the estranging language and images which make perceptible, visible, and audible that 
which is no longer or not yet perceived, said and heard in everyday life. (1978: 72) 
 
There have been many notable examples of theatre censorship, political, moral and religious, 
throughout the world over the last century.2 While the geographical and ideological 
circumstances may differ, what these censored works have in common is their representation 
of alternative social, political and moral codes of behaviour; they focus on change and 
challenge the status quo.  
 
The legacy of censorship 
The way to get rid of weeds is to abolish fields. (Václav Havel 1983: 4) 
 
In his mocking reference to the censors and their impression on the literary landscape, Havel 
highlights the damaging and sometimes counterproductive impact of censorship. The effects and 
legacy of censorship are not always easy to measure, dictated as they are not only by political 
requirements and social mores of the day, but by various interpretations of what constitutes 
censorship and how it should be applied. It is impossible to calculate how many books were 
never written, or plays were never staged because of censorship. It is clear that censorship 
can have a negative impact on dramatists and theatre practitioners, on publishers and 
translators, on the public, and on the cultural landscape itself, both at the moment of 
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censorship and into the future. Non-contentious, non-political works become the mainstay of 
literary production under authoritarian regimes, while politically correct works may dominate 
in democratic contexts, a trend that can be seen in the discourse on offence and the need to 
avoid it in literature and society. 
 
Censorship most obviously affects the domestic author but in addition may hinder the influx of 
foreign ideas through the censorship of foreign works and the control of translation. Censorship, 
therefore, not only limits what can be disseminated within a state, but may also try to influence 
the information flow in and out of a country in order to protect both the status quo internally 
and  the  state’s  reputation  abroad. 
 
For the writer unwilling or unable to work within the restrictions imposed, censorship can lead to 
anger, despair and hopelessness. The lack of opportunity for normal dialogue and exchange 
around political and moral ideas may result in the  writer’s  self-imposed silence. Some decide 
to write, not for the censor, but for export, or for posterity, and resign themselves to the idea 
that their work will not be published under the prevailing rule; others simply give up. Still 
others choose or are forced into exile, although, as the Romanian dissident novelist Petru 
Popescu observes, another curious aspect of the complex and ambiguous relationship between 
the censor and the censored is the attempt sometimes made by the former to lay claim to people 
they previously denounced. This tends to happen once they are in exile and have an established 
international  reputation:  ‘First, one is not allowed to create, which results in emigration, and then 
one is claimed as a shining example of the national genius instead of being acknowledged as one 
of its victims, or perhaps I should say survivors’  (1976: 72). 
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One of the great consistencies in censorship, particularly but not exclusively in the context of 
restrictions imposed by autocratic regimes, is its function as a threat and a warning against 
future action. As Foucault and others have shown, this is what helps to create the fear that 
leads to self-censorship and the normalisation of compliance. Recent examples in democratic 
states, particularly in the aftermath of the Salman Rushdie affair, can be seen in publishers’ 
decisions to play it safe and not to publish literature that might cause upset.3 At its most 
successful, censorship is internalised and self-censorship is practised, consciously or 
unconsciously. Self-censorship is one of the most insidious and unquantifiable effects of 
cultural control and censorship can, as both Butler and Bourdieu have suggested, be a 
formative process, producing certain responses through internalised acceptance of social 
norms and self-policing. 
 
In autocratic states, self-censorship often means that the writer is working with the censor in 
mind, rather than the public, adapting ideas and expressions to suit the prevailing cultural 
norms. This may be conscious and strategic, or unconscious and the result of the 
naturalisation of censorship within society. It not only affects writers, but also publishers, 
theatre producers and translators who play a role in conveying the work to the public and who 
also stand to be punished if the work in question is in breach of the rules. It is this form of 
censorship more than any other that can lead to a wider cultural impoverishment in society, as 
it undermines the core function of creative work by making it compatible with dominant 
political goals, rather than free to challenge them. Yet in terms of political correctness, as 
Janelle Reinelt reasons, self-regulation can be seen as either positive or negative, and it is a 
particular concern in contemporary democratic states. She maintains that  ‘if  censorship  is  
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suppression of expression by force, political correctness is suppression of expression by 
cognitive  assent  or  social  pressure’ (2011: 134). 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly when one considers that certain limits are accepted in all societies, and 
given the increasing acceptance of censorship as more than a simple repressive force, some have 
argued for the recognition of its positive effects. It could be claimed, for example, that as a direct 
result of its censorship by the authorities, literature has come to enjoy increased importance in 
some societies; after all, if it is worth restricting, then it must be of some value. Writing about 
democratic societies, for example, Dollimore  contends  that  ‘to  ban  a  book  is  to  guarantee  its 
place in cultural history’  (2001: 95). Thus the very attempts to eliminate alternative views give 
them not only visibility, but also a certain weight and validity. For  Butler,  ‘the  regulation  that  
states what it does not want stated thwarts  its  own  desire’,  bringing  into  public  discourse  what  it  
would like to make unspeakable (1997: 131-32). Censorship, it can be claimed, has led to the 
creation of political literature, for better and for worse, and has also led to increased creativity in 
the theatre. Another consequence of this is that, in post-authoritarian societies, cultural 
production suddenly freed from censorship may feel disappointingly insubstantial. After all, 
wherever censorship exists so too do imaginative efforts to evade and subvert it. These range 
from straightforward attempts to influence and negotiate with the censors, to Aesopian strategies 
of disguising or veiling a political message in order to ensure the authorisation of a work. The 
rise of symbolism and other techniques in experimental theatre in various autocratic states could, 
therefore, be viewed as a positive consequence of the restrictions imposed by the censors. 
 
Several of the essays in this collection refer to the strategies and devices employed by dramatists 
and practitioners to parody or mock the authorities that would censor them. In Zimbabwe, as 
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Zenenga shows in his contribution, traditional theatrical devices were used as an evasion 
technique  when  making  political  theatre,  and  other  creatively  ‘positive’  outcomes  can  be  seen  in  
the emergence of experimental, non-text-based theatre in Poland, Portugal, Hungary and several 
other states, as other essays in this volume show. Jean Graham-Jones refers to such actions as 
‘counter-censorship’,  ‘a  constructive  alternative  to  the  double-bind of external censorship and 
internal self-censorship’ (2011: 105). A further side effect of this may be a way of ‘reading 
between the lines’ on the part of a public looking for a hidden political message. For Holquist, 
‘one  of  the  ironies  that  define  censorship  as  a  paradox  is  that  it  predictably  creates  sophisticated  
audiences’  (1994: 14). Given the ideological imperatives at work in certain political contexts, the 
theatre should be, and often is, read in an  ‘interested’  way, and the spectators are complicit in the 
contestation of censorship. This may be aided by editors, translators and publishers working 
with authors to counter the effects of censorship by presenting the work in a less provocative 
manner,  while  preserving  the  central  point.  Such  positive  ‘framing’  of  a  play  is  mentioned  in  
Tyszka’s  description  of  the  work  of  certain  Polish  critics, and also in Poniž’s  reference  to  the  
work of the director in the Slovenian context. 
 
There is another side to this, of course, and the claim that censorship is a positive productive 
force is one favoured by many censors looking to counter the argument that they damage culture. 
The South African academic and censor J. M. Leighton insisted in 1976 that some of the best 
writers (he cites Shakespeare and Milton) completed some of their greatest works under harsh 
censorship. He further suggested that good writers will use their tools cleverly to say what they 
wish to say using the guile and wisdom of their trade, and that literature will be the better for it: 
‘the  writer  who  is  totally  destroyed  by  censorship  law  is  not  a  writer,  but  a  mediocrity’  (1976: 45). 
It is an argument that allows the censors off the hook for any harm they may cause. Not all 
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attempts to avoid or to counter censorship have been successful, however, and even where they 
are, few would argue that a creative outcome should be taken as justification for the imposition of 
censorship in the first place. Jansen, quoting the Polish novelist Tadeusz Konwicki, warns of the 
possible long-term, more negative effects of such attempts to outwit the censors: 
 
Initially it may be positive because it forces an author to find subtle forms of expression 
to  evade  the  censor’s  ban.  But  these  forms  soon become conventions, the secret 
language becomes public, and the censors will ban it too. So new, more subtle forms 
must be devised. And so it goes, on and on, the literature becomes increasingly more 
obscure, eventually losing all traces of life. (1988: 194-95)  
 
Not always obvious, but nonetheless detrimental, one of the longer-term effects of censorship 
is its contribution to the cultural impoverishment of society. Dramatists, theatre companies and 
directors, publishers and translators who fall foul of the authorities see their possibilities for 
future work limited as their notoriety or association with blackballed writers or works is used 
against them. Censorship may lead to the growth of anti-intellectualism in society, where 
writers are seen as treasonous, untrustworthy critics, and normal discourse and creative 
processes are curtailed. Again, it is hard to predict the long-term damage that is suffered by the 
cultural professions that have to accommodate their practices to censorship, be it overt and 
systematic as in Spain, Poland or Argentina, for example, or unofficial and ad hoc, as in 
contemporary Western democracies. In states where censorship has been practised at the level of 
publication, readers may have been introduced to texts, both domestic and foreign, in a 
bowdlerised form and may never have had access to the original as created by the author; dramas, 
as conceived by the playwrights, may never have been staged. Yet, even where censorship 
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legislation has changed and new freedoms exist, a negative legacy may remain. School and 
public libraries, bookshops and private collections may still be filled with the censored versions 
of texts, as most publishers have not retranslated and republished works post-censorship and 
theatres do not necessarily stage previously censored works once the restrictive legislation has 
been rescinded. 
 
The cultural heritage passed on to the next generation is, therefore, a distorted one with 
unexplained silences. When, if ever, the silenced authors are permitted to speak, they may 
find themselves confronted with an audience uninterested in dwelling on the past and a new 
generation of writers with an alternative focus. Thus, the negative impact of censorship on 
canon creation is also worth considering, though as we see in several essays in this collection, 
the link between censorship and canon is a multifaceted one, as the use of existing canonical 
works sometimes allows for challenges to orthodox views in societies where freedom of 
expression is restricted. 
 
Overall it can be argued that the reach of censorship is long. The cultural poverty often 
engendered by strict censorship and the encouragement of both writers and public to self-censor 
can lead to a distrust in culture generally and a failure to embrace all of the possibilities that it 
offers society with regard to the exploration of important social, political and moral issues. 
 
Today, as more previously unknown material is becoming available through the opening of 
archives and the examination of their contents, we have an opportunity to contemplate the 
impact of censorship on several areas in society. Archival research helps us to understand 
better the systematic nature of censorship and its motivations where it has been applied by 
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state censors such as the Lord Chamberlain in Britain, by state officials in Hungary, Poland, 
Slovenia and East Germany, and under military dictatorships in Spain, Portugal and Brazil. 
Archives, such as those considered in several of the essays in this collection may also reveal 
the difficulties encountered by censors in interpreting and implementing norms, and those 
encountered by authors, theatre companies and publishers in their attempts to protect and 
disseminate their work. An additional, often overlooked, outcome of such archival research is 
that it also allows for the correction of misinformation and lies propagated over the years 
about certain authors and books, and it alerts people to the fact that the version of a text that 
they read may not have been the complete, uncut version. Furthermore, opening the archives 
can be a cathartic experience, part of a process of truth and reconciliation following regime 
change, and it is therefore related to our understanding of our history and ourselves.  
 
The essays 
Contributors to the volume are academics and theatre practitioners, and some fit both of these 
categories. Their essays explore theatre censorship across Europe, Asia, Latin America, the 
United States and Africa, often drawing on original material from state archives. The volume is 
divided into three parts. The first deals with first-hand testimony of those directly engaged in 
conflicts over freedom of expression; the second with historical and current examples of 
censorship in authoritarian regimes; and the third with analyses of censorship and cultural control 
in democratic states. There are, however, significant parallels and intersections between the three 
parts, allowing us to create a fuller picture of the censorship experience and its impact on society. 
Indeed, what emerges from the volume as a whole is a consistency in censorship practices, 
motivations and justifications across geographical, temporal and political divides. The 
contributions to this volume demonstrate the importance of studying censorship, while taking 
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cognisance of divergences and shifts in the political, social and historical contexts described, in 
order to enhance our understanding of the past, to counter falsehoods perpetuated about certain 
authors and works and, significantly, to further our knowledge of the human impulse to censor. 
 
In the opening essay of part one of the volume, the playwright, poet, novelist and filmmaker 
Fernando Arrabal, banned by the Franco regime in Spain but celebrated internationally, 
perversely  cherishes  censorship  as  a  ‘gift’  bestowed  by  those  in  power. His contribution 
constitutes an uncompromising defence of freedom of thought and expression. Proud of the fact 
that  his  entire  œuvre  was  banned  in  the  final  years  of  the  Franco  dictatorship,  he  attacks  
‘inquisitors’  of  all  kinds  and  celebrates  artists  and  thinkers  he  has  known  who  maintain  their  
independence and resist manipulation. 
 
In his contribution, academic and theatre director Juliusz Tyszka addresses subversive student 
theatre productions of 1978 and 1979 in Communist Poland. While there was an office charged 
with censorship, its practice was far wider than the activities of this one centre, and we are 
reminded  that  ‘every  institution  in  the  country,  especially  those  dealing  with  the  diffusion  of  mass  
information,  was  totally  controlled  by  the  party-state  totalitarian  apparatus’. Tyszka describes the 
hardline theatre censorship during the Stalin years before going on to consider student theatre, of 
which he was a practitioner himself, during the thaw. He focuses in particular on one dissident 
group, Teatr  Ósmego  Dnia  (Theatre  of  the  Eighth  Day)  and  how  it  was  targeted  by  the  censors.  
He  points  to  the  often-overlooked  role  of  the  critic  in  ‘framing’  a  piece  of  theatre  for  public,  or  
indeed  official,  consumption. 
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In considering the main phases and impact of theatre censorship in Spain under the Franco 
regime, Patricia  W.  O’Connor  highlights other less obvious forms of control, such as the use of 
prizes to reward supporters of the regime, and press campaigns against its opponents. She argues 
that one of the consequences of censorship was long-term damage to the international reputation 
of Spanish theatre. Moving beyond her survey of Spanish theatre censorship, O’Connor also 
recounts her own personal clashes with the authorities while she carried out research in the 1960s 
and 1970s, which led to her arrest and deportation. 
 
Playwright, campaigner and academic Abhi Subedi analyses the complexities and challenges of 
writing and performing theatre in South Asia, where the legacy of colonial censorship is still felt, 
and where overt and repressive measures are combined with more insidious forms of control. He 
shows how language, semiotics and silence have become tools for the artist, who is threatened by 
an uneasy authority and who, as a consequence, writes  ‘with  tears,  ink  and  fire’. 
 
Theatre director Lisa Goldman explores contemporary theatre censorship in the UK and Iran, 
documenting her experiences in both places in 2010. She describes a time of political turmoil in 
Iran and a young population clamouring for change. Closed theatre workshops where opinions 
could be freely expressed contrasted with public discourse mindful of the ever-vigilant state spies. 
What emerges here is the recourse by playwrights to myth, symbol and allusion to discuss 
contemporary issues. As in Poland, it is acknowledged that the restrictions in Iran have led to 
certain creative innovations, but Goldman refutes the notion that these could be seen to justify 
censorship generally. Turning to discussion of her involvement with Sikh writer Gurpreet Kaur 
Bhatti’s  2010 play, Behud (Beyond Belief), itself a response to the censorship of her earlier play 
Behzti (Dishonour) (2004), Goldman highlights thorny issues in recent discussions of 
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contemporary censorship in democratic societies, such as the avoidance of social unrest and 
offence and debates around multiculturalism and consensus. 
 
Shifting the focus from the experience of practitioners to the analyses of literary critics and 
theatre historians, the second part of the volume explores various examples of historical and 
current censorship across several repressive regimes. Slovenian theatre director and academic 
Denis Poniž considers  the  official  reception  of  Arrabal’s  The Architect and the Emperor of 
Assyria in Yugoslavia and points to the variety of political bodies that were involved in cultural 
control  there.  The  case  of  Arrabal’s  work  in  Yugoslavia  is  an  interesting  one,  as  the  playwright  
was generally feted there as an enemy of fascism, but nonetheless, as Poniž shows, this play was 
interpreted negatively by the communist regime and concerns were raised about the possible 
interpretation of the play as a criticism of the country’s leadership. Additional disquiet was 
expressed about  the  ‘inappropriate’  sexual  content  of  the  play and, more unpredictably, about 
a negative reference to God. The discussions about censorship of this play are also 
noteworthy for their exposure of divisions between a liberal and a more conservative wing of 
the ruling party.  
 
Joanna  Ostrowska’s  essay  explores  the  complex  and  ‘perverse’  relationship  between  
experimental theatre groups and censorship in Poland. She addresses the positive creative output 
of such companies,  in  what  she  describes  as  the  practitioners’  game  of  hide  and  seek  with  the  
censors. One of the consequences of this was the introduction of other types of restriction (on 
location, length of run, etc.) in order to regain the upper hand. The paranoia of the regime is 
highlighted by its exclusively political interpretations  of  experimental  theatre:  ‘They  could  not  
understand that art without a political subtext could exist.’  Given  the  mistrust of the censors and 
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the ambiguity of the system, Ostrowska explores the strategies employed by dramatists in order 
to evade or circumvent the censors. Much of the experimental theatre in Poland developed within 
the university system, a fact that allowed some protection for the artists, as the public and the 
works concerned were considered of minority interest and, therefore, less dangerous. She 
demonstrates how foreign connections were exploited, and street theatre grew, in mostly 
successful attempts to evade the harsh censorship of the authorities. 
 
Barrie  Baker’s  contribution concerns the ban imposed on a controversial play, Der Georgsberg, 
written in 1984 by Rainer Kerndl, the drama critic of the national newspaper in the former 
German Democratic Republic. Focusing on the insidious nature of censorship under communist 
rule  and  the  regime’s  concern  for  its  reputation  abroad,  this  essay  documents  the  fall  from  grace  
of a government supporter. Baker contends that there is still some mystery surrounding the 
prohibition of the play, and he puts forward some likely reasons for the negative assessment of 
the work and considers the political players who may have been implicated in the events. 
 
The use of the canon to evade censorship is evident from Zsófia  Gombár’s  contribution,  in  which  
she  contrasts  the  reception  of  Shakespeare’s  theatre  in  Hungary and Portugal and points to some 
unexpected parallels across such ideologically opposed regimes. The most obvious difference she 
notes is that censorship in Hungary tended to be political, while in Portugal the focus was on 
moral control. Her essay, which draws on materials from state archives, also attests to the 
difficulties faced by the censorship researcher, as the evidence for indirect censorship methods is 
scarce. Gombár also questions the idea that the censor was unintelligent, and she interprets acts of 
tolerance on the part of censors as a way of diffusing certain tensions: allowing the public to see a 
29 
subversive play was a safe way of allowing opposition to be expressed, without any meaningful 
threat to the authorities. 
 
Ana Cabrera’s  essay  on  censorship  during  the  dictatorship  in  Portugal focuses in particular on the 
years 1950 to 1974, a period that includes the transition from Salazar to Caetano in which 
censorship practices were relatively stable. Based on research carried out in the state archives, 
she considers the difficulty of interpreting the vague and contradictory guidelines available on 
political and moral issues. Her essay highlights the  censors’  problems  when  dealing  with  
canonical texts which were often a resource for practitioners to express criticism indirectly. As 
Cabrera demonstrates, in Portugal, just as in Spain and elsewhere, national authors were more 
harshly censored than foreign authors. 
 
Mayra Rodrigues Gomes and Eliza Bachega Casadei trace the development and shifts in theatre 
censorship in Brazil from 1925 to 1970, using as a tool the documents held in the Miroel Silveira 
Archive in São Paulo. Their investigations not only give us insight into the workings of 
censorship across many decades and political transitions, but also highlight the importance of 
such archival work for the recovery of ‘lost’ or forgotten plays. From their examination of 
censorship documents, they are able to define types of censorship employed, to identify the 
genres most often targeted, and to consider the concerns of the censors both generally and at 
particular – often politically sensitive – points in time. 
 
Drawing on her TRACE [TRAducciones CEnsuradas – Censored Translations] project, which 
mined the Spanish censorship archives for information on translated texts, Raquel Merino 
Álvarez considers the treatment of foreign drama in Spain under Franco. In addition to offering 
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us information about the translators not recorded elsewhere, this essay demonstrates how in Spain 
foreign drama was less harshly treated than domestic drama, and recounts how taboo topics were 
often introduced via foreign plays. 
 
Praise Zenenga’s  contribution  centres on censorship in post-independence Zimbabwe. He 
describes how the post-independence regime employed censorship legislation from its colonial 
past in an attempt to control critics of the new ruling elite. He illustrates the variety of controls, 
laws, detentions, beatings, intimidation and other forms of persecution used to target popular 
theatre, which, with its long tradition of political and social commentary in Zimbabwe, is 
considered a threat. 
 
The third part of the volume reflects the kinds of censorship and cultural control that have 
flourished and continue to exist in democratic societies. Censorship in democratic societies is 
often considerably more nuanced and harder to identify and label than in authoritarian regimes, 
though it is striking that many of the same arguments, motivations and justifications arise. The 
examples here are both historical and current and echo discussions of the nature of censorship in 
writings by contemporary critics. Focusing on examples from Europe and the US, these essays 
consider the power of lobby groups, particularly where official censorship bodies are absent. 
Such hidden censorship is revealed in Donal  Ó  Drisceoil’s  contribution.  He argues that while 
Ireland escaped official state censorship of the theatre under British rule and later under the 
Free  State,  ‘indirect control was maintained, based upon the threat of revoking theatre licences, 
or even introducing an explicit censorship of the stage’.  He  exposes  the  authorities’  attempts  to  
impose political detachment in theatrical productions during WWII when Ireland maintained 
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an official neutrality. This was done despite the lack of formal legislation, but was often 
successful in its unofficial and invisible censorship methods of neutralising the stage. 
 
Steve Nicholson presents an analysis of British theatre censorship up to 1968 and questions its 
effectiveness and its impact, noting that  ‘no-one was killed by the British system of theatre 
censorship or had their life threatened, no-one was sent to prison, and probably no-one’s  career  
was  ended’.  Whilst evasion was common and plays were often subjected to mild cuts or delays, 
the overall impact of censorship seems to have been minimal. Yet,  he  argues,  ‘the  struggle  to  
abolish  stage  censorship  was  passionately  fought’,  and  citing  Sir  Peter  Hall,  he  suggests  that  
‘beneath  the  superficially  genteel  processes  of  control,  the  boot  of  the  state remained ready and 
waiting  to  be  called  upon  if  required’. 
 
John Houchin considers the legal battles prompted by the staging of the political rock-musical, 
Hair (Ragni, Rado and MacDermot, 1968) in the United States. The court cases took place during 
the Nixon Years, 1970 and 1975, a period that marks the transition between the freedoms 
associated with the 1960s and the consolidation of the New Right. He argues that the decisions 
made in this landmark case define the contemporary relationship between freedom of speech and 
performance in the United States. 
 
Vicki  Ann  Cremona’s  contribution  documents  the  social  debate  and  legal  battles  that  began  in  
Malta in January 2009, following the prohibition on moral grounds of the play Stitching by the 
Scottish author Anthony Nielson. The theatre company involved unsuccessfully challenged the 
ban, but has since taken the case to the European Court of Human Rights, where a verdict has yet 
to be delivered. The repercussions in Malta have been significant, and the censorship laws have 
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been changed. The essay not only demonstrates the impact of cultural regulation within a modern 
democratic state, but further highlights the complex and current issues surrounding public 
performance, morality, politics, and our understanding of theatrical representation as something 
that may reflect and explore the darker side of human nature without celebrating it. 
 
 
Theatre censorship remains a current practice in many countries, sometimes tacit or hidden, at 
other times overtly imposed. The present collective volume aims to improve our understanding 
not only of theatre and its interpretation, but also and more generally, of the interactions 
between culture and the state. It allows us to create a fuller portrait of censorship – both 
repressive and productive – of the arts in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The plays 
that authorities or social groups choose to ban or to allow reveals much about the political 
situation and the moral climate of the day; changes in censorship and our understanding of it 
are, therefore, accurate markers of social and political transformation. Censorship is not 
simply a historical issue, but rather a complex and constantly contested live one. It merits our 
attention because it remains relevant in contemporary society and can both add to our 
knowledge of the past and help to inform current debates about freedom of expression. This 
volume encourages us to perceive common threads and parallels in censorship practice across 
ideologies, states and times, thus allowing us to draw some conclusions about the nature of 
censorship itself, its relationship with the theatre in particular and with the state more 
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